His Majesty’s Advocate v. Christopher David Brown [2025] HCJAC 14

Crown appeal against sentence:- After a trial at Edinburgh High Court the appellant was convicted of a charge of murder. Following the obtaining of a Criminal Justice Social Work Report, the trial judge sentenced the respondent to life imprisonment with a punishment part of 13 years. The Crown appealed against the length of the punishment part on the ground that it was unduly lenient. The evidence disclosed that the respondent had repeatedly struck the deceased and punched him to the head and body and dragged him outside the house where the respondent was then living and he subsequently died. On behalf of the Crown it was submitted that the sentencing judge had failed to make reference to the relevant sentencing guidelines and it was not clear how she had approached her assessment of the seriousness of the offence or her assessment of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. It was submitted that the punishment part selected was unduly lenient and, having regard to what was said in HMA v Bell 1995 SCCR 244, fell outwith the range of sentences which a judge at first instance, applying her mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably have considered to be appropriate. Whist the sentencing judge referred to the guidance given in HMA v Boyle 2010 JC 6 which suggested that the length of punishment part would typically increase as one moves along a scale of four distinct categories of murderous assault- (1) murderous assault; (2) murderous assault involving the use of a knife or sharp instrument with which the offender deliberately armed himself; (3) murderous assaults involving a firearm, or attacks upon a child or a policeofficer; and (4) cases of the most extreme severity, the sentencing judge fell into error by her rigid application of the guidance and placing the current case in the lowest category. It was submitted that the circumstances of the present case were similar to those in HMA v Callander 2014 SCCR 135 where a headline punishment part of 17 years would have been imposed. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that whilst the sentence could be described as lenient it was not unduly so, particularly having regard to what was said by the court in Boyle, there being no applicable sentencing guideline for the selection of punishment parts. Here the court considered that the punishment part of 13 years was unduly lenient and substituted a punishment part of 17 years. The court stated that a punishment part of 12 years or lower as discussed in Boyle is lower than would be appropriate in most murder cases and should only be imposed in cases where there is strong mitigation available or the circumstances of the case were exceptional. The court noted that in the present case there were no mitigatory circumstances present and the sentencing judge erred in treating the offer of a plea of guilty to culpable homicide as being of relevance. The court also noted the respondent’s lack of remorse, his attitude when interviewed by the author of the CJSWR in which he disputed he was guilty of murder and blamed the deceased for what occurred. The court also considered that there were a number of aggravating factors present including the sustained nature of the attack over a number of hours, the substantial level of violence used and the level of injuries inflicted and the fact of putting the deceased outside his house following the prolonged attack. Further, the court noted that the respondent had a significant record of previous offending including numerous convictions for violence. The court also pointed to a number of similarities with the case of Callander and the case of Laurie v HMA [2019] HCJAC 3 where the punishment part imposed was 18 years and concluded that it could not be said that the present case was one which was towards the lower end of the range of gravity.