Appeal by stated case:- On 2 October 2017, at Dunoon Sheriff Court, the appellant was convicted after trial on summary complaint of a charge of dangerous driving contrary to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The circumstances were that the appellant overtook three cars at excessive speed whilst approaching the brow of a hill causing another motorist, who was travelling in the opposite direction, to take evasive action in order to avoid a collision. That motorist noted the registration number of the appellant’s car and reported the manner of the driving to the police. Later that evening police officers observed the appellant’s car outside a hotel and went in to try and locate him. The police officers made a section 172 requirement of him within around 2 hours of the incident. The appellant’s reply was “Me, I was driving”. He was cautioned and charged with a contravention of section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and was then, at 8.15pm, given a warning in terms of section 1 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The appellant was convicted of the charge by the sheriff. The appellant appealed against his conviction by stated case. The appeal raised two issues:- (1) whether the sheriff was entitled to find that the warning in terms of section 1 was given “at the time the offence was committed”; and (2) whether there was corroboration of the appellant’s admission to police that he was the driver of the vehicle at the material time. In relation to the section 1 warning issue in terms of Section 1 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 the sheriff was only entitled to convict if the appellant had received a timeous warning, namely, at the time the offence was committed, if within 14 days of the commission of the offence a complaint was served or within 14 days of the commission of the offence a notice of intended prosecution was served on him. Here the appellant did not receive either service of a complaint or of a notice of intended prosecution and the issue was whether he was given a warning “at the time the offence was committed”. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there is a dual or conjunctive test that not only must there be an unbroken chain of circumstances but also an additional test of reasonableness. Here the court considered that the sheriff was correct to hold that the warning was given at the time of the offence. The court considered that there is only one test, namely, whether applying reasonable latitude, the warning can be said to have been given at the time of the accident and regard should be had to whether there is an unbroken chain of circumstances. The court considered that there was an unbroken chain in the circumstances of the present case. In relation to the issue of corroboration of the appellant’s admission to driving made to the police in response to the section 172 requirement made of him, the court considered that there was evidence capable of corroborating that admission. The court observed that very little was required to corroborate the appellant’s admission to police. The court pointed to the appellant being in the hotel close to the incident shortly after it occurred which in itself was corroborative. The court also pointed to other evidence which was capable of providing corroboration, like the fact that the registered keeper of the car was the appellant’s wife. The court observed that, referring to Fox v. H.M.A. 1998 JC 94, circumstantial evidence only has to confirm or support the direct evidence and does not need to be more consistent with it than with a competing factual account. As such the sheriff was entitled to make the findings in fact he did in relation to:- (1) the appellant being the driver of the vehicle at the material time; and (2) the section 1 warning being given at the time of the offence.