Myles Gibson Simpson v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2015] HCJAC 20

Appeal against sentence:- On 9 July 2013 the appellant pled guilty of indictment to a charge of assault by inter alia threatening to stab ‘X’ in the eye with an uncapped needle to her injury. An agreed narration of facts was presented to the sheriff and he adjourned for reports and subsequently remitted the case to the High Court under section 195 of the 1995 Act. Thereafter, the appellant was made subject of an Order for Lifelong Restriction and received a punishment part of 3 years. The appellant appealed that the imposition of the order for lifelong restriction was excessive. The second ground of appeal was on the grounds that the punishment part of 3 years imprisonment was excessive and a discount of 25% ought to have been applied given the plea of guilty by the appellant. In relation to the first ground of appeal it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that whilst it was accepted that the risk criteria were met criticisms were made in relation to the decision of the judge in relation to the future risk posed by the appellant and that the appointed Risk Assessor had conceded that the classification of the appellant as high risk was marginal and that the sentencing judge had not given “appropriate weight” to Dr Baird, a consultant psychiatrist instructed for the appellant, and his assessment of a variety of protective factors. Here the court refused this ground of appeal. It observed that what the solicitor advocate on behalf of the appellant was trying to do was to reassess the evidence that had been led before the sentencing judge. There was no suggestion, indeed it was conceded on behalf of the solicitor-advocate, that there was no foundation in the evidence for the sentencing judge to have made the finding in relation to the appellant that he did. In relation to the second ground of appeal, it was allowed. It was noted in his report to the court by the sentencing judge that he had omitted, in error, to apply a discount of 25% to the punishment part he having overlooked the fact that the appellant had pled guilty to the charge.