Murray Albert Geddes v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2015] HCJAC 43

Note of appeal against sentence:- On 23 September 2014, at Edinburgh High Court, the appellant pled guilty under accelerated procedure to a contravention of section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, namely, causing death by dangerous driving. On 18 December 2014, the appellant was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, reduced from 11 years on account of the early plea. He was disqualified from driving for 12 years and ordered to sit the extended driving test. The appellant appealed against the sentence imposed on the grounds that it was excessive having regard to the Definitive Guideline ‘Causing Death by Driving’, published by the English Sentencing Guidelines Council in July 2008 which have been applied in the Scottish courts. The circumstances of the offence here were that the appellant was driving his car after consuming considerable alcohol. He was described as “falling about” and a back calculation subsequently carried out indicated he had 158mgs per 100ml of blood which is around twice the legal limit for alcohol. The appellant was seen to be travelling at excessive speed up to 95mph and driving erratically, overtaking vehicles when it was unsafe to do so. The appellant lost control of his car and crashed resulting in the deceased, who was a passenger in the car and who was not wearing a seatbelt, being thrown from the vehicle and being killed instantly. It was submitted here on the appellant’s behalf that whilst the sentencing judge had been entitled to regard the case as a Level 1 offence in the Guidelines the judge erred in increasing the starting point to 11 years due to what were described as aggravating features, namely his previous conviction for speeding less than a month before the present offence and his consumption of alcohol. It was submitted that the aggravating factors had already increased the offence to a Level 1 offence in the first place. It was further submitted that the discount of around 20% was insufficient having regard to the plea being tendered under the accelerated procedure and the judge was wrong to take into account the strength of the evidence against the appellant in restricting the discount. Here the court allowed the appeal. The court noted that once the judge at first instance had categorised the case as Level 1 due to the nature of the driving and the consumption of alcohol it was inappropriate to then increase the starting point by taking the same factors into account as aggravating features. The court considered here that the starting point should not have been increased beyond 9 years given the speeding conviction (for which the appellant had received a fine of £350 and 5 penalty points). The court considered that the fact the deceased had been a close personal friend of the appellant was an additional mitigating factor which ought to have been considered before the appellant’s genuine remorse was taken into account. In all of the circumstances the court considered that the starting point should be 8 years. In relation to the issue of discount the court noted that it is a matter primarily for the judge at first instance and, whilst reasons had been advanced for a period of 3 months elapsing between the appellant’s first appearance and his plea of guilty, the judge had been entitled to restrict the discount to be applied, however, the court here allowed a discount of 25% reducing the starting point of 8 years to 6 years. In addition, the court considered that a period of 8 years disqualification after discount was appropriate in the circumstances.