Stephen Sangster Senior and Stephen Sangster Junior v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2017] HCJAC 4

Note of appeal against conviction:- On 11 March 2016, at Edinburgh High Court, the appellants were convicted after trial of a charge of attempted murder. On 26 April 2016 the appellants received extended sentences of 13 years comprising of 10 years in custody and an extension period of 3 years. The appellants appealed against their convictions on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to prove that each of the appellants was a participant in the assault and the trial judge wrongly repelled a submission of no case to answer. In addition, the second appellant contended that no reasonable jury, properly directed, could have convicted the appellant relying on the identification evidence of a Crown witness, Laura Williamson, whose evidence was such that no reasonable jury could have considered it sufficiently reliable to convict the second appellant. The circumstances were that the complainer gave emphatic identification evidence implicating both appellants. The issue at the appeal was whether corroboration of the positive identification of each of the appellants by the complainer could be found in the other evidence including the evidence of Laura Williamson. In evidence Williamson stated that neither appellant was involved in the assault. On 2 December 2014 Laura Williamson attended a VIPER identification parade of the second appellant and identified him as being one of the persons she described in her police statement being involved in the assault. On 10 December 2014 Laura Williamson attended a VIPER identification parade of the first appellant and identified him as being one of the persons she described in her police statement being involved in the assault. At the close of the Crown case a no case to answer submission was made on behalf of both appellants. The trial judge repelled the submission referring to the case of Muldoon v Herron 1970 JC 30 and that the identification of the appellants by Laura Williamson at the two VIPER parades, if accepted, was available to corroborate the emphatic identification evidence of the complainer. Here it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that Laura Williamson had not adopted any part of her police statements in relation to the identification of the appellants and thus the identification evidence from the VIPER was not evidence of the truth of the matter as what took place at the parade was inextricably linked to the police statements. In relation to the second appellant’s contention that no reasonable jury properly directed, could have returned a verdict of guilty as they would have required to have found corroboration in the evidence of the witness Laura Williamson it was submitted that in light of the unsatisfactory nature of Laura Williamson’s evidence no reasonable jury could have considered her credible and reliable for the purposes of corroboration of the complainer’s evidence. On behalf of the Crown it was submitted that in light of the emphatic identification evidence given by the complainer little more was required to corroborate the account of the complainer. It was submitted that the trial judge was correct to apply the principle in Muldoon as it was clear that the questions asked by the police at the parades were directed at the identification of the assailants. In relation to the second ground of appeal it was submitted that the evidence relating to Laura Williamson’s identification at the VIPER parades was not so deficient that no reasonable jury, properly directed, could have accepted it as credible and reliable. Here the court refused the appeal. The court considered that the trial judge had been correct to apply the principle in Muldoon and that the identification evidence relating to Laura Williamson’s VIPER parades was available as corroboration. The court considered that the police evidence of the witness identifying the appellants in response to the set questions regarding the content of the witness’s police statement was available for corroboration and the subsequent denials from the witness about what had taken place at the parades did not result in the evidence of what happened losing its status as evidence which, if accepted, could be used by the jury to corroborate the complainer’s evidence. The court went on to state that simply because the VIPER parade is held some time after the commission of the offence is not a bar to the application of the principle. In relation to the second appellant’s second ground of appeal the court considered that it was open to the jury, in light of the other evidence in the case including what happened at the VIPER parade, to rely on the evidence of Laura Williamson, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of aspects of her evidence.