Andrew Brown v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2016] HCJAC 31

Reference from the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission:- On 11 April 2014, during the course of a trial, the appellant pled guilty to a charge of murder, threatening behaviour and attempting to pervert the course of justice. On 4 June 2014 the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a punishment part of 20 years. His co-accused was convicted after trial of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a punishment part of 20 years. The appellant had previously appealed against his sentence on the ground that the punishment part selected was excessive on the basis of his background and personal circumstances which included a very difficult upbringing and the utilitarian value of the plea, as the trial judge did not consider that the plea coming only 3 days before the end of a 5 week trial had had any utilitarian value. The appeal was refused on 19 August 2014 due to the murder being categorised as concerted, premeditated and extremely violent. The appellant’s co-accused had his appeal against sentence allowed to the extent of reducing the punishment part to 17 years on account of him having been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and that he had been upset to a greater degree than normal as a result of the deceased’s death and that the trial judge had been wrong not to differentiate between the appellant and the co-accused. The SCCRC referred the appellant’s case to the High Court and stated that they could not:- “see any material difference between the two accused as regards their culpability and their sentences.” It was submitted here on behalf of the appellant that the court, in reducing the co-accused’s punishment part, was wrong to distinguish between them and the punishment part was excessive in all the circumstances. Here the court observed that it would have been preferable for both appeals to have been heard together and allowed the appeal against sentence and reduced the appellant’s punishment part to 17 years to ensure comparative justice there being no basis to distinguish the appellant’s sentence with that of his co-accused.